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ABSTRACT: This article addresses the lack of rigor associated
with the application of comparative strategy in professional military
education. It also offers an analytical approach to help students
identify case-selection bias and thereby strengthen the value of case
comparisons in the curriculum.

I

nstructors frequently use case studies to teach students to compare
the strategies that different countries have used to respond to similar
threats and challenges. Despite the popularity of using this approach
to comparative strategy in professional military education (PME), there is no
systematic effort to discuss its contours or establish guidelines for its use.
This article discusses how best to use comparative strategy coherently,
given its increasing use in PME.
The first and second sections of this article discuss the concept of
comparative strategy with an emphasis on its potential value and the
trends regarding its expanding use in an increasingly internationalized
PME context. The third section identifies challenges in applying
comparative strategy; while the fourth section offers suggestions for
mitigating those challenges.

Concept

To establish a definition of comparative strategy, we can look at
the way academic studies define comparisons. In political science the
comparative method is understood “in terms of the rules and standards
and procedures for identifying and explaining differences and similarities between cases often (but not always, defined in terms of countries),
using concepts that are applicable in more than one case or country.” 1
Also lacking a universal definition, strategy sometimes refers to a set of
objectives or the management of resources to achieve a goal. The US
Department of Defense, for instance, articulates strategy as a “prudent
idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in
a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/
or multinational objectives.” 2
For purposes of this article, strategy is the coordination of all
domestic and international activities—including the use of force—that
civilian and military organizations execute to achieve national security
goals. By extension, comparative strategy appreciates the differences and
similarities of such orchestrations. The comparison should, at the very
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2      US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms doctrine from its birth in
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least, consider the geographical, historical, cultural, and institutional
elements of the action to identify possible causes necessitating
the activity. The primary purpose of the analysis is not to dismiss a
general theory but to test it and refine it in distinct, national contexts.
Comparing the implementation of new technologies in distinct national
military organizations, for instance, could illuminate the mechanisms of
innovation within the armed forces, the importance of doctrine, and the
role national cultures played in shaping such processes.3
While this approach may provide generalized knowledge about a
state’s strategy, it may also downplay or ignore specific differences. Thus
caution should be exercised before applying general theories. That said,
a rigorous approach to comparative strategy should, by definition, yield
scientifically useful results. Indeed, one political scientist recognized “it
makes no sense to speak of a comparative politics in political science,
since if it is a science, it goes without saying that it is comparative in
its approach.” 4
Ideally, using comparative strategy should allow scholars to identify
the limitations of a given strategic theory or to amend its conceptual
framework. Comparative strategy is also vital as a trial-and-error method
that might enable students to refine analytical tools or to develop new
theories and hypotheses. The current lack of a rigorous methodological
approach to comparative strategy, however, often allows students at
PME institutions to compare case studies, or an “instance of a class of
events,” without appreciating the peculiarities of each case.5

Trends

The evolution of the use of comparative strategy can be understood
as a consequence of the institutional, professional, and intellectual
expansion of PME. During recent decades, national war colleges
have gradually opened their enrollments to foreign participants from
allied and partner nations. Annually, the US Army War College hosts
approximately 80 foreign officers each year, the Royal College of
Defence Studies invites students from 50 partner countries per year,
and a third of the 200 students enrolled in the French War College hail
from one of 60 partner nations.6 Such institutions have internationalized
not only their attendance but also their programs. The US Department
of Defense now supervises five regional centers that provide partner
3      For examples, see Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences
for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W.
Jentleson, and Larry Berman, eds., Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988); Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France,
Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Jack
L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1984).
4      Gabriel A. Almond, “Political Theory and Political Science,” American Political Science Review
60, no. 4 (December 1966): 878.
5      As used here, class of events is consistent with “a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as
revolutions, types of governmental regimes, kinds of economic systems, or personality types that the
investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory (or ‘generic knowledge’) regarding
the causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of that class of events.” Alexander
L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2005), 17–18.
6      “International Fellows Home,” US Army War College, accessed January 22, 2018; “College
Members,” Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, accessed January 22, 2018; and “L’École,”
Ecole de Guerre, accessed January 22, 2018.

Teaching Strategy

Samaan

29

nations tailored instruction on such topics as security sector reform,
civil-military relations, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation.7
Other institutions specifically designed for an international military
audience—such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Defense College, the Baltic Defense College, the Inter-American Defense
College, and the European Security and Defence College—have also
changed the landscape of military education by putting comparative
strategy at the center of the learning process.8
Hitherto, doctoral students in military history or international
relations defended their dissertations within their home countries. With
doctoral programs integrating students from around the world, faculties
in both civilian and military institutions now come from many nations.
Even the method of teaching strategy in today’s war colleges reflects the
internal “globalization” debate about rebalancing the discipline from a
traditionally Western scope.9 These trends create an environment that
favors the international exchange and comparison of strategic ideas. This
reciprocity, in turn, calls for the intellectual development of comparative
strategy itself. In short, a comparative strategy approach matters because
it not only expands students’ cultural awareness but also allows them to
challenge their basic assumptions about national security priorities and
military policy and planning processes.

Challenges

Because war college students typically enroll after operational
assignments, they are not often well-versed in the academic study of
strategic context. International assignments may enhance cultural
awareness, but they rarely supply an analytical framework for rigorously
researching geographical, historical, cultural, and institutional variables. As a result, students often select case studies based on personal
interest or proximity rather than clear relevance to a research question.
Thus, one of the primary challenges for using comparative strategy
in PME is case selection. Absent rigor, two competing issues can
undermine comparative strategy: studying only the peculiarities of cases
and presenting the findings as universal rules. These factors preclude
the discovery of useful generalizations and create a challenge between
false uniqueness and false universalism.10
False uniqueness, a traditional bias, sees the country under study
as so exceptional in its history, its culture, and its political system that
  7      The George Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Williams J. Perry Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the
Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. Larry
Hanauer et al., Evaluating the Impact of the Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014).
8      For more on other NATO efforts such as the European Security and Defence College, the
5+5 Defence College, or the ongoing project of the Gulf Cooperation Council Defence College,
see Jean-Loup Samaan and Roman de Stefanis, The Ties that Bind? A History of NATO’s Academic
Adventure with the Middle East, Eisenhower Paper no. 1 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2014).
  9      Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James E. Worrall, “Global Strategic Studies: A Manifesto,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 40, no. 3 (2017): 347–57; Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western
Eyes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); and Pascal Vennesson, “Is Strategic Studies
Narrow? Critical Security and the Misunderstood Scope of Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40,
no. 3 (2017): 358–91.
10      Richard Rose and W. J. M. Mackenzie, “Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis,” Political
Studies 39, no. 3 (September 1991): 446–62.
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any attempt to apply findings from studying it to other situations—
or conversely to apply findings from other cases to it—are doomed
to failure. This bias can be explained by the traditional skepticism of
regional experts regarding the import of models and theories developed
without in-depth understanding of their empirical fields. In military
institutions, such bias can be derived from a national instinct—the inner
belief in “the exceptional nature of my country’s experience”—which is
nurtured within servicemembers to build a cohesive identity and loyalty.
False universalism, which relates to the intellectual foundations of
strategy in rational choice theory, may be a harder issue for national
security practitioners to tackle. Furthermore, such universalism is very
often Western universalism. The language of strategy matters here since
the discipline of strategic studies may be global in terms of instructor
and student backgrounds, but teaching and research are primarily in
English. Therefore, students may arrive at universal generalizations
derived from Western-centric material or biased comparisons, which too
often serve to confirm preconceived notions.11 The linguistic monopoly
deriving from US primacy, in particular, carries preconceptions that
cannot be ignored when comparing various national experiences.
The war college curricula of Persian Gulf countries that are allied
with the United States, for example, tend to be influenced by the
American PME model. But a well-established concept in the American
strategic context, “national security,” is translated into Arabic literally
as al-Amn al-Watani. This translation does not consider US notions of
nation and Arabic notions of watan differ greatly as both refer to very
distinct experiences of political identity building and of state formation.12
Likewise, American debates on the relevance of terms such as “homeland
security” simply do not resonate in Arab or European contexts, which
conflate the expression with “national security” or “domestic security.”
These linguistic subtleties are too often underestimated, if not ignored.
But their misuse in other national contexts carries the same risk of
false universalism.
With regard to nuclear weapons, strategists have also looked mostly,
if not exclusively, at Western experiences. For a long time, scholarship on
the topic was based on the nuclear postures between the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and it assumed the
findings from these cases were generalizable.13 As a result, concepts and
theories of nuclear deterrence were developed in a specific context of two
global powers involved in various regional conflicts. These principles
were then applied incorrectly to very different contexts such as the
regional powers of China, India, Pakistan, and, Israel whose security
predicaments shared few commonalities with those of the United
States or the USSR.14 As researchers attempted to explain the causes for
11      Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979).
12      For more on the modern development of the Arab state, see Ghassan Salamé, ed., The
Foundations of the Arab State, Nation, State, and Integration in the Arab World, vol. 1 (London: Croom
Helm, 1987).
13      See among others, Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1989); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1990); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966); and Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1962).
14      S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not like
Cold War Europe,” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 127–52.
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successive nuclear weapons programs, they paid scant attention to the
specificities of the nuclear strategies; if they did, they frequently assumed
views similar to Western ones.15
A proper comparative analysis can prevent us from inappropriately
applying Western theories of nuclear deterrence to Asian countries
and can offer alternative answers. Considering the limitations of past
studies, recent assessments have used different models to reach a broader
understanding of nuclear doctrine. Notably, these approaches factor in
the availability of a reliable third-party security patron; the existence of
a conventional, superior, and proximate threat; civil-military relations
within the nuclear power; and resource constraints.16 This framework still
relies on general variables, but also aims to understand local dynamics.
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, for instance, favors asymmetric escalation.
This characteristic exists not only because of the absence of a third-party
ally but also because of the military’s conventional inferiority and its
primacy over civilian authorities for controlling its nuclear weapons.
Again, the selection of cases for comparison affects the reliability
of results. Scholars and students generally have three options for
conducting comparative strategy: analyzing many different countries
(large-n study), comparing a small number of countries (small-n study),
and examining a single country (case study or monograph). Larger
comparisons tend to follow a quantitative approach that includes
aggregating data on the national militaries under observation and
comparing statistics. Smaller studies can include quantitative analysis
but usually lean towards a more qualitative approach. Case studies and
monographs typically examine a particular national experience deeply.
In PME, research trends toward qualitative comparisons of three
to four different countries. A potential pitfall, students frequently act
upon case selection bias by choosing cases for investigation intuitively
before thinking rigorously.17 Students in European war colleges, for
example, often select cases from NATO members with the expectation
that linguistic, geographical, cultural, or political similarities confer
relevancy. These students likely find it difficult to conceive non-Allied
cases may be more relevant for testing their initial hypotheses.
This pitfall may seem paradoxical, as students simultaneously assert
the fundamental importance of these variables to understanding their
own national experiences. Consequently, students may draw lessons
from European militaries without considering important variables—for
example, an assessment of German military strategy may not consider
how the Second World War legacy and its implications on German
civil-military relations constrain the international missions of the armed
forces today. Similarly, some students may underestimate the significance
of a variable such as financial constraint on European defense cases

15      Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of the
Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97): 54–86; and Jacques E. C. Hymans, The
Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006); and Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace.”
16      Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 32.
17      David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative
Research,” World Politics 49, no. 1 (October 1996): 56–91
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simply because their own military does not operate under the same
budgetary pressures.
Other issues, such as the benchmarking bias or leadership variable bias,
prevent students from fully exploiting comparative strategy because
of deeply ingrained beliefs that cannot be easily dismissed in any adult
learning environment. Students often compare cases using benchmark
analyses rather than academic assessments. In other words, they select
cases on whatever is considered—or what they believe is considered—to
be a best practice. The students then assume their analysis will yield
obvious lessons or recommendations for their own countries.
This logic yields inaccurate results. Even though their relevance
is questionable, comparisons with the United States are commonplace
in both European and Middle Eastern institutions. At the practical
level, these studies are convenient because of the massive amount
of scholarship produced on the US strategic experience and also, at
times, because instructors are American. For the militaries of small
states, comparing themselves with a major power can be a means of
self-flattery, a statement of purpose in itself. But because this type of
comparison is driven by expected outcomes—the best practices—it
frequently excludes the national experience that led to the observed
end state. Such comparisons may be shallow, especially if they ignore
or downplay important variables that could caution against applying the
results too broadly.
Beyond best practices, case studies elucidate the best or worst
examples of leadership, a variable excessively emphasized within PME.
According to this bias, strategy fails because of bad or shortsighted
leadership, while successes result primarily from brilliant and innovative
leadership. Sometimes, students attribute successes merely to one
strategy or solely to the quality leadership of a commander. Not only
do such articulations introduce problematic, monocausal explanations,
but they also rely on retrospective illusion. Based on an outcome—the
success or the failure—a leader or commander is deemed either brilliant
or misguided from the start. But in some cases, leaders started poorly
and adapted effectively. Conversely, leaders may have had a great plan
that was not executed precisely at the operational level.
Thus as an explanatory variable, leadership remains problematic.
The concept is not well-defined, and it is too often used by students
as “magic card” to explain in hindsight the success or failure of one
experience. Because the ultimate goal of PME is to educate and prepare
future leaders in the field of national security, it is no surprise that
students would see an individual as the central variable of national
history. But too often leadership is an explanatory factor that blurs,
rather than illuminates, the case study.
An additional factor, omitted variable bias, occurs when students fail to
consider one or several explanatory factors in their comparisons.18 When
any comparison between armed forces is loosely designed, the study
generates several flawed conclusions. Failing to distinguish between
causation and correlation can lead to misidentifying the key variables of
explanation and eventually to false results.
18      Jonathan Hopkin, “The Comparative Method,” in Theory and Methods in Political Science, David
Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 299.
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Aside from these challenges, the epistemological problems
provide another counterargument for incorporating comparisons.
Rational choice theory, which posits actors and systems will behave in
universal patterns, so heavily influences the discipline that comparisons
emphasizing local differences have been eliminated.19 By focusing solely
on a cost-benefit analysis, rational choice theory empties cases of human
specificities and discards culture and tradition as a means of explaining
the behaviors and decisions of policymakers. The limitations of this
approach are well-documented in scholarship, however, its salience in
PME institutions persists.

Suggestions

Comparisons in the field of strategy largely use qualitative, small-n
studies. Thus the following guidelines are for that context. These
guidelines provide tools to select more relevant cases and measure those
cases’ similarities and differences. These suggestions cannot address
all the challenges for comparative strategy, but they can help achieve
analytical inequality.
The first device involves clearly identifying the question driving the
research project before comparing any feature or variable in a case. Once
the question has been established, the comparatist can focus on the
important purpose of comparative strategy: distinguishing between the
particular properties of two or more cases and identifying the structural
causes responsible for those differences. Ideally, these causes can then be
applied in other contexts. The added value of comparing is not simply in
the juxtaposition of two or more national military experiences, however.
Comparative research can also explore key questions of strategy and
provide new knowledge to the discipline, but only through careful
case selection and effective differentiation of cases similarities and
differences. Formulating a well-circumscribed inquiry before cases are
chosen allows the researcher to probe a hypothesis and the comparative
process to produce and to test new theories.
After clearly defining the objectives, students need to evaluate
the relevance of potential case studies to the hypotheses. The main
requirement for case selection should be analytical equivalence. One
prerequisite that could be important to a case analysis is a geographical
comparison, which would examine the effects of geography on
the political and military structures of the compared states. Such a
comparison should consider the implications of physical parameters on
military resources, training, and basing. Obviously, a landlocked country
such as Ethiopia would not allocate military resources in the same way
that an island state such as Singapore would. Therefore a case study
testing a hypothesis involving the contrasting characteristics would not
produce relevant findings.
Geographical parameters also pertain to political and social
considerations. Obviously, conflicts between neighboring countries—
such as South and North Korea, India and Pakistan, or France and
Germany (before 1945)—could be useful for a comparison of other
19      Lawrence Freedman, “The Limits of Rational Choice,” in Strategy: A History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 575–89; and Stephen Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice
and Security Studies,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 5–48.
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countries with similar tensions. The proximity of a regional hegemon
also influences national strategies, such as balancing or bandwagoning.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, for example, built two
very different foreign and defense policies vis-à-vis neighboring Saudi
Arabia. Similarly, many members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) derive their strategies vis-à-vis China.
Comparative analysis must also consider historical legacies created
by past experiences that shape a country’s contemporary strategic
orientation and play a significant role in its strategy. Too often, students
explore contemporary issues without considering how historical events
shape the way policymakers and military commanders assess current
events and make decisions.20 As Robert Jervis wrote, “Previous
international events provide the statesman with a range of imaginable
situations and allow him to detect patterns and causal links that can help
him understand his world.” 21 Leaders may be cognizant of a legacy or
it can be a subconscious bias. France’s skepticism of a NATO missile
defense strategy vis-à-vis nuclear deterrence, for example, resonated
with negative views held by France’s political and military establishment
regarding defensive strategies. Arguably, these views are shaped by the
legacy of the Maginot Line that French armed forces implemented in
the 1930s, which partly caused their defeat against Germany in 1940.22
Similarly, Germany’s military policy remains heavily-shaped by the
memory of the Second World War. Today, the memory of Nazi war
crimes hangs over German military policy, which imposes tight civilian
control over the Bundeswehr and very strict mission scopes as observed
in German operations with NATO in Afghanistan.23
Strategic culture also informs state trajectories. In Jack Snyder’s
seminal study of Soviet strategic behavior, the notion of strategic culture
is defined as “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses,
and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic
community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share
with each other.” 24 This definition emphasizes the importance of
cognitive processes in the ways actors come to perceive and frame
phenomena in the international arena. Even when this cultural factor
relates to geographical and historical legacies, it goes beyond them. It
also refers to the way the social fabric of a country, its statecraft, and its
national identity translate at the level of its military forces.25 Discerning

20      Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions
of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
21      Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2017), 217.
22      Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; and Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and French Military Doctrine
before World War II,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter
J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 186–215.
23      Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the
Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” International Studies
Quarterly 56, no. 1 (March 2012): 67–84.
24      Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 1977), 8.
25      Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Katzenstein, Culture of National Security.
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strategic cultures may be challenging, but it enables us to better grasp
the relationships between national narratives and military strategies.26
Strategic culture examines military organizations as a reflection of a
nation being understood as an “imagined community.” 27 Furthermore,
this variable acknowledges external observers may perceive geographical,
historical, or other factors of a given country very differently than
its decision makers do. Israel’s reliance on offensive doctrines and its
occasional use of preemptive force, for example, can be understood by
looking at the origins of the modern Israeli state and how the elements
of its political identity—the combination of Zionism and a deep sense of
permanent insecurity—have shaped its military culture.28 Studying the
experience of war in a country such as Israel can help future decision
makers in US institutions to grasp the politics of security in Israel, the
specific strategic culture it developed, and the choices it has made with
regards to military doctrines. Likewise, officers can better apprehend
the contemporary European military debate by comparing the legacy of
the Second World War on countries such as Germany and France and
then reflecting on their major differences.29
Lastly, comparative strategy should integrate the role of institutions
in shaping national security policies. Students too often dismiss
bureaucracies because of their mundane natures. But institutional
arrangements matter, as they reveal the interaction between civilians
and armed forces. These relationships inform us of not only the nature
of the political system but also the operational implications of using
armed force.30 In this regard, recent comparative studies on nuclear
strategies are valuable. Contemporary scholarship on cases regarding
China, India, and Pakistan shows how assertive or delegative civilian
control of forces affects nuclear posture.31 The different nuclear strategies
of India and Pakistan are the result of competition between civilian
and military authorities in each country. Indian civilians are wary of
political intervention by armed forces, therefore their government
closely supervises nuclear policy. In Pakistan, however, the military
enjoys direct control over the country’s nuclear arsenal and largely

26      Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4
(Spring 1995): 32–64; Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory
Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (January 1999): 49–69; and Jeffrey S. Lantis,
“Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” International Studies Review 4, no. 3 (December 2002):
87–113.
27      Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(New York: Verso, 1983).
28      For more on Israel’s strategic culture, see Michael Handel, “The Evolution of Israeli Strategy:
The Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest for Absolute Security,” in The Making of Strategy:
Rulers, States, and War, eds. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 534–78; and Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, Israel’s Strategic
Doctrine (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1981).
29      Allison Abbe and Stanley M. Halpin, “The Cultural Imperative for Professional Military
Education and Leader Development,” Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–10): 20–31.
30      For case studies on civil-military relations, see Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing
State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2012); Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian
Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015); and Florence Gaub, Military Integration after Civil
Wars: Multiethnic Armies, Identity, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (London: Routledge, 2011).
31      Narang, Nuclear Strategy, 36; and Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging
Nuclear States,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–93): 160–87.
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defines its doctrine.32 In other words, institutional arrangements also
play a significant role in shaping national strategies.
Systematic considerations of, and building upon, the foregoing
parameters should prevent comparatists from succumbing to flawed
results caused by omitted variable bias. Such an approach will enable
researchers to not only emphasize the similarities and the differences
between cases but also highlight underlying research questions—for
example, why X uses its armed forces differently from Y in a similar
situation despite similar past experiences.
As a practical example, consider a military strategy adopted by a small
state in pursuit of its national security. Identify an underlying research
question or hypothesis. A starting assumption might be that a small
state has no choice but to either bandwagon with the local hegemon or
balance power with an external ally. In this manner, case studies can
help isolate variables influencing the state’s preferred strategy. To test
the hypothesis, “small state” must be defined, in particular geographic
and political indicators should be established.33 Obviously limited in
scope, the following analysis applies the foregoing recommendations to
a concrete case.
The UAE, Singapore, and Estonia share geographical similarities
such as proximity to regional hegemons (Saudi Arabia and Iran,
Malaysia and China, and Russia, respectively) and an overwhelming
inferiority in terms of size, population, and resources. Historical and
cultural considerations emphasize such peculiarities as the symbolic
significance of Iranian control of UAE islands as well as the cultural ties
between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, past Chinese and British presences
in Singapore, and the Soviet occupation of Estonia.
In all three cases, research may suggest small states tend to mix
bandwagoning and balancing rather than relying on one strategy.
Balancing might be defined as relying both on security patronage from
a major power, such as the US, and on developing indigenous defense
forces. At the institutional level, this balancing may translate into very
different situations. The defense of Estonia relies on NATO. Singapore
and UAE defenses involve loose regional security architectures from
the ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council, respectively. The latter
therefore favor more bilateral defense cooperation.
More profoundly, all three of these sample cases underline an
element of the initial concept of strategy: how much the strategies of
small states rely on external security from bilateral partnerships and
multilateral alliances. Their inherent vulnerabilities deny them solely
domestic sources of security. In this context, applying the framework of
comparative analysis, which relies on selected cases that directly test the
initial hypothesis, allows for better identification of the general lessons
for small-state security. In any case, appropriate analytical guidelines
should prevent researchers from oversimplifying the specificities
of each case.
32      Huma Rehman, “Nuclear Command and Control Systems: Pakistan and India,” CISS Insight
(June–July 2013): 27–36.
33      For more on small states security, see Giorgi Gvalia et al., “Thinking Outside the Bloc:
Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States,” Security Studies 22, no. 1 (2013): 98–131; and Efraim
Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer, eds., The National Security of Small States in a Changing World (London:
Frank Cass, 1997).
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Scholars and practitioners need a broader discussion of how to apply
comparative strategy in the classroom. This article has raised some of
the most significant challenges in PME institutions. It has tried to close
a surprising gap in the existing literature on strategy, with regard to the
uses—and misuses—of comparisons. Because of the quasi absence of
past exchanges on the topic, much must yet be done. This article does
not pretend to present a definitive account of what should be termed
comparative strategy but rather to offer some recommendations on
potential ways to mitigate or prevent unreliable results from its practice.
Given the internationalization of professional military education,
comparative strategy is likely to become one of its major research
methods. Moreover, the globalization of PME institutions should not
merely rely on Western-centric curricula and research materials. If we
are to avoid such a phenomenon, more attention should be dedicated to
building a comparative approach that finds a proper balance between
in-depth analysis of similarities and differences in various armed forces
and the search for more general knowledge for strategic studies.

